Why Trump Should Threaten Op Plan 314 If Cuba Doesn't Hold Free And Fair Elections

Suitcase Nukes And Club-K Nukes Will Come From Cuba, Not Panama

Update - President Elect Donald Trump has may getting China out of Cuba a priority now. This exactly what we recommended in this article. Rahm Emanuel brought China into Cuba to have a “Club-K” threat against the United States, and we applaud Donald Trump for recognizing this fact, and rooting out the weapons being stockpiled in Cuba.

In addition to the Chinese encroachment in Cuba, Trump has also begun to become uncomfortable with Chinese employees running the Panama Canal for all intents and purposes.

Appeasement of Cuba and lifting restrictions and sanctions over the last ten years has not worked. Cuba has only gotten more calcified with “friends of Raoul”. Cuba has made no move toward free and fair monitored election, and Cuban refugees have waited another ten years for no justice.

Much speculation has occurred about President-Elect Donald Trump’s plans to invade Panama since his “We’ll see about that” tweet to the Panamanian President regarding the sovereignty of the Canal.

Panama has been an ally of the United States since 1903, when Panama was split off from Columbia, and we had been partners during that time in the Panama Canal.

Cuba, on the other hand, has been classified by the United States as a terrorist nation, and they have threatened the United States with nuclear mass murder since 1962. If suitcase nukes are going to be snuck into the United States, the nuclear devices will come from Cuba. I called this the Samsonite Option and this threat was made to President Kennedy by the Soviets through Cuba during his Presidency.

If Club-K hypersonic missile nukes are going to be fired at the US, they are going to be fired from Cuba, not Panama.

For these National Security reasons, I would like to reintroduce the Trump Administration to the book I wrote in 2019 recommending the execution of Op Plan 134 or Op Plan 136 for the Invasion of Cuba if Cuba does not immediately hold free and fair elections, monitored by the Organization of American States.

From Google Gemini Search -

OPLAN 314, like other operational plans of its kind, was not written by a single individual but rather developed through a collaborative effort by military planners within a specific command structure. In the case of OPLAN 314, the primary responsibility fell to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), with significant input and development by CINCLANT (Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command).

Here's a breakdown of the process and the key players:

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): The JCS, the highest military authority under the President and Secretary of Defense, provided overall guidance and direction for the development of contingency plans, including those for Cuba. They would have outlined the strategic objectives and approved the final plan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis was General Maxwell Taylor. He had been recalled to active duty by Kennedy, who trusted him implicitly.

I believe Trump should declassify Op Plan 134 (or Op Plan 136) to let the Cubans know precisely what is coming if they do not hold free and fair elections immediately. The US has had the Cuban Missile gun to its head since 1962. We covered how Rahm Emanuel and the Chicago Mob knew of pre-positioned Club-K Missiles in Cuba, and we stated that these Cuban Missiles need to be flushed out immediately.

Again, this Invasion has been planned in the utmost detail since the Summer of 1962, and it has been wargamed every year since then.

From Google Gemini -

The Process:

• Guidance and Objectives: The JCS, based on guidance from the President and the National Security Council, would have established the overall strategic objectives for the operation.

• Plan Development: CINCLANT's staff, working with planners from other commands, would have developed the detailed operational plan, including force composition, timelines, logistics, and specific objectives for each unit. This would have been an extensive and ongoing planning effort.

• Review and Approval: The plan would have gone through multiple reviews and revisions, with input from the JCS and other relevant authorities. The final plan would have been approved by the JCS and, ultimately, the President.

You can easily see from the map that the short-range Club-K missiles are far more of a threat from Cuba than Panama. We have site inspection privileges with all our Allies in the Caribbean Basin but not for our Terrorist classified nations like Cuba.

My former research partner was quite adamant that Rahm Emanuel, in his many trips to Cuba, was arranging a “Veto Option” for the Chicago Mob and Mossad interests in Cuba with Club-K missiles that could be hidden in normal shipping containers.

I wrote a book about Journalist Jenny Moore’s reporting, where she made predictions gathered from Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) personnel about biological and nuclear weapons threats that Rahm Emanuel and the Chicago Mob might make in terms of injuring Trump’s first Presidency.

Those biological weapons threats certainly did seem to come to pass with a Military Live Exercise for a biological attack in March 2020, through Covid. Now, the stealth container nuclear threat (Club-K) seems like just the other shoe waiting to drop. Detailed drone detections of nuclear material in Cuban Ports should begin on the first day of the Trump Presidency.

With the Club-K Missile System, the missiles are hidden in normal shipping containers until the moment before firing to create a stealth threat.

A massive shock and awe-opening attack would be required to destroy Command and Control and all Cuban Port dockyards.

We identified the Club-K threat in the Port of Canaveral in the Summer of 2017 in a deal put together by a close associate of Rahm Emanuel, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew. Jack Lew put together a Club-K with Russian General Igor Sechin under the cover of an Arab Oil company called Crescent.

You can read more in “The Braverman Prophecy” about Jack Lew and Rahm Emanuel.

Here is the history of JFK and RFK’s consideration of Op Plan 134. All JFK and RFK files should be immediately declassified upon Trump taking office.

President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy considered the invasion of Cuba using options like OPLAN 314 (and later, the more robust OPLAN 316) during numerous meetings throughout the spring and summer of 1962, and especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. These meetings primarily took place within the framework of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm).

Here's a more detailed look:

• Pre-Missile Crisis Meetings: Even before the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy administration was actively exploring ways to remove Fidel Castro from power. OPLAN 314, developed as a contingency plan for a potential invasion, would have been discussed in various national security meetings throughout 1962, particularly in the context of Operation Mongoose, the covert CIA program aimed at destabilizing the Cuban regime. These meetings were often led by the Special Group (Augmented), a subcommittee of the National Security Council. RFK was particularly interested in pursuing aggressive action against Cuba during this time.

• Here's a timeline of relevant meetings and activities during the spring and summer of 1962, where OPLAN 314 would have been part of the discussions:

  March 1962:

  • Operation Mongoose Review: Throughout March, there were several meetings of the Special Group (Augmented), the body overseeing Operation Mongoose, the covert action program against Cuba. These meetings, often attended by Robert Kennedy, would have reviewed the progress of Mongoose and discussed various options, including military contingency plans like OPLAN 314. OPLAN 314 had just been drafted the previous month.

  • March 14: A meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) discussed the need for more aggressive action against Cuba, reflecting the growing frustration with the lack of progress in removing Castro. This likely included discussions of what military options were available, or being developed.

  • March 19-20: JFK met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the exact details of the discussions are not fully known, it's likely that contingency planning for Cuba, including OPLAN 314, was on the agenda.

  April - May 1962:

  • Continued Mongoose Meetings: The Special Group (Augmented) continued to meet regularly throughout April and May to review Operation Mongoose. These meetings would have provided a forum for discussing and refining military contingency plans like OPLAN 314, particularly if covert actions were failing to achieve the desired results.

  • April 10: A memo from General Maxwell Taylor to the Special Group (Augmented) highlighted the need for a "prompt and effective" U.S. response in the event of a Cuban attack on the U.S. or another Latin American country. This indicates that contingency planning, including OPLAN 314, was being actively considered in response to specific scenarios.

  • May 8: JFK met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review military plans and readiness. While the specifics of the discussions on Cuba are not fully known, it's highly probable that contingency plans like OPLAN 314 were addressed.

  June - July 1962:

  • Intensified Planning: As intelligence reports indicated a growing Soviet military presence in Cuba, military planning efforts likely intensified. OPLAN 314, or variations of it, would have been reviewed and updated to reflect the changing situation on the ground.

  • June 13: A Special Group (Augmented) meeting focused on the implications of Soviet military aid to Cuba. This would have been a key opportunity to discuss the adequacy of existing military plans, including OPLAN 314, in light of the evolving threat.

  • June 19: Robert Kennedy pushed for consideration of sabotage, which may have spurred some discussion of a larger invasion if sabotage failed.

  • June 28: A memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense outlined various military options for Cuba, including a full-scale invasion. This suggests that OPLAN 314, or a similar invasion plan, was being actively considered at the highest levels of the military.

  • July 23: The Special Group (Augmented) discussed the need for a "contingency plan" in the event of a Soviet move against Berlin, with a possible link to Cuba. This demonstrates that contingency planning for Cuba was being considered in the broader context of Cold War tensions.

  August 1962:

  • OPLAN 316 Development: By August, it's likely that planning had begun on OPLAN 316, the larger and more robust invasion plan that would eventually supersede OPLAN 314. However, OPLAN 314 may still have been considered a viable option, particularly for a more limited or rapid response.

  • August 23: A National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 182) directed the development of contingency plans for various scenarios in Cuba, including a possible invasion. This indicates that military planning, likely involving both OPLAN 314 and the emerging OPLAN 316, was ongoing.

  • August 27: A CIA report that Surface to Air Missiles were being delivered to Cuba by the Soviets surely sparked new discussions at the highest levels of government about the possibility of a military response.

  Key Takeaways:

  • OPLAN 314 was not formally presented and approved at a single meeting. Instead, it was part of an ongoing planning process that evolved throughout the spring and summer of 1962.

  • The Special Group (Augmented) meetings, particularly those attended by Robert Kennedy, were a key forum for discussing and refining military contingency plans for Cuba, including OPLAN 314.

  • The increasing Soviet military presence in Cuba during the summer of 1962 added urgency to the planning process and likely led to the development of OPLAN 316 as a more comprehensive invasion plan.

  In conclusion, OPLAN 314 was considered in numerous meetings throughout the spring and summer of 1962, primarily within the framework of the Special Group (Augmented) and in discussions between the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other national security officials. These discussions were part of a broader effort to develop contingency plans for addressing the perceived threat from Cuba, and they intensified as the situation evolved, eventually leading to the development of OPLAN 316 and culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

• ExComm Meetings (October 16-28, 1962): During the 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the ExComm met almost continuously to debate options for responding to the Soviet missile deployment. JFK attended most, but not all, of these meetings. RFK was present for all of them. The possibility of a full-scale invasion, using plans like OPLAN 314 and 316, was one of the primary military options considered. These meetings were held in the White House Cabinet Room and the Oval Office.

• Key Dates:

  • October 16: The ExComm was formed, and the invasion option was discussed from the outset.

  • October 17-20: Military representatives briefed the ExComm on invasion plans, including OPLAN 314 and the evolving OPLAN 316. There was considerable debate about the feasibility and potential consequences of an invasion.

  • October 21: A key meeting where JFK reviewed the military options in detail, including a presentation by CINCLANT (Admiral Dennison) on the invasion plans. This meeting is often cited as a pivotal moment where the scale and risks of an invasion became starkly apparent.

  • October 27: "Black Saturday," the most dangerous day of the crisis. The ExComm continued to weigh the invasion option amid escalating tensions and fears of an imminent Soviet response.

JFK and RFK's Roles:

• JFK: As President, JFK was ultimately responsible for the decision-making process. He carefully considered the military options, including invasion, but was also deeply concerned about the potential for nuclear war. He ultimately opted for a naval blockade ("quarantine") of Cuba combined with diplomatic pressure.

• RFK: As Attorney General and JFK's closest advisor, RFK played a crucial role in the ExComm discussions. He was initially a hawk, advocating for strong action against Cuba, and was involved in discussions regarding OPLAN 314 in the spring and summer of 1962, but during the crisis he evolved into a key proponent of a negotiated solution. He played a critical role in the back-channel communications with the Soviets that ultimately helped resolve the crisis.

Other Important Considerations:

• OPLAN 316 Supersedes 314: As the crisis unfolded, OPLAN 316, with its larger force and more comprehensive approach, became the more relevant plan for a potential invasion. It is likely that while OPLAN 314 was initially considered as a framework for planning, by the time of the crisis it was not seen as a viable option.

• Secrecy: The ExComm meetings were highly secret, and the details of the invasion plans were closely guarded.

• Alternative Options: The ExComm also considered other options, including airstrikes and a naval blockade. The decision to pursue a blockade was a complex one, influenced by a variety of factors, including the risks of an invasion, and the potential for escalation.

In conclusion, JFK and RFK, along with other members of the ExComm, seriously considered the invasion of Cuba using plans like OPLAN 314 and 316 during numerous meetings throughout 1962, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October. The ExComm meetings, particularly those held in the White House Cabinet Room, were the primary forum for these discussions. Ultimately, the decision was made to pursue a naval blockade and a diplomatic solution rather than a full-scale invasion.

where was the landing beach and drop zones for Op Plan 314 for the 82nd airborne

2.0 Experimental Advanced. Lacks access to real-time info and some Gemini features.

While the full details of OPLAN 314 are still not entirely declassified, based on available information and analysis of similar operations, we can deduce the likely landing beaches and drop zones for the 82nd Airborne Division within the framework of the original, "quick strike" version of the plan.

It's crucial to remember: OPLAN 314 was the earlier, smaller-scale invasion plan. OPLAN 316, the later and much larger plan, likely involved different and more extensive landing areas. Also, plans such as this would have contained options and contingencies based on how the situation developed. What is described below are the most likely scenarios.

Likely Drop Zones (DZ) for the 82nd Airborne:

The 82nd Airborne's primary role in OPLAN 314 would have been to seize key airfields to facilitate the rapid buildup of heavier forces and supplies. Therefore, the drop zones would have been chosen for their proximity to these strategic locations:

1. San Antonio de los Baños Airfield: This was a major Cuban Air Force base southwest of Havana. Securing this airfield was paramount to neutralizing Cuban air power and establishing U.S. air superiority. The 82nd, perhaps along with the 101st Airborne, would likely have had a drop zone near or even directly on this airfield.

2. Campo Libertad (later, Campo Columbia): Another important airfield closer to Havana, also used for military and civilian purposes. While perhaps not as critical as San Antonio de los Baños in the initial assault, securing Campo Libertad would have been a high priority. The 82nd, likely in concert with the 101st, may have had a drop zone in the vicinity of this airfield.

Possible Landing Beaches:

OPLAN 314's amphibious assault component was smaller than that envisioned in OPLAN 316. The landing beaches would have been chosen to support the airborne assault's objectives and allow for a relatively rapid link-up with the paratroopers. The most likely amphibious landing area would be:

1. South Coast, near Havana: The south coast of Cuba, in the general area south and southwest of Havana was a likely location for amphibious landings. This would have provided a relatively direct route to support the airborne troops at San Antonio de los Baños and Campo Libertad, as well as facilitate an advance on Havana.

Specific Beaches (Speculative):

• Playa Mayabeque: A beach located south of Havana, near the town of Melena del Sur. It has been mentioned in some analyses as a possible landing site.

• Beaches in the Zapata Peninsula: While the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos) is on the Zapata Peninsula, it is unlikely that the planners of OPLAN 314 would repeat the mistakes of that failed invasion by choosing the same location. Other beaches on the peninsula or further east could have been considered, but they would be farther from the main objectives around Havana. This area is also more swampy and difficult to move through.

Important Considerations:

• Deception: The actual landing beaches and drop zones would have been closely guarded secrets, and deception operations would likely have been employed to confuse the Cubans about the true targets.

• Flexibility: OPLAN 314, like any military plan, would have had built-in flexibility to adapt to the situation on the ground. The exact landing beaches and drop zones might have been adjusted based on the latest intelligence and the unfolding events.

• Coordination: The airborne and amphibious assaults would have been closely coordinated to ensure mutual support and achieve a rapid link-up of forces.

In Conclusion:

Within the framework of OPLAN 314, the 82nd Airborne Division's likely drop zones were in the vicinity of San Antonio de los Baños Airfield and possibly Campo Libertad, both crucial for establishing air superiority and supporting the advance on Havana. The amphibious landings would likely have taken place on the south coast of Cuba, southwest of Havana, with specific beaches chosen to facilitate a rapid link-up with the airborne forces. However, these are educated deductions based on available information, and the exact details of OPLAN 314 remain subject to historical debate and further declassification of documents.